

# 1 **Do crash rates really increase with increases in average speed?**

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## 4 **Abstract**

5 For more than two decades speed limit enforcement has been supported by research that "shows"  
6 that crash rates increase with increasing average speed.

7 Safe driving is primarily determined by being alert, being unimpaired, and driving at an appropriate  
8 speed and with an appropriate clearance distance for the environment at the time. This should  
9 ensure that a driver can break or swerve in time to avoid an impact.

10 And note speed limits are never set based on maximum safe speeds, nor are they set with any  
11 precision.

12 This paper reviews the papers by Nilsson, TRL, Kloeden et al and others that show benefits from  
13 reducing average speeds, and shows they contain errors or are inconclusive. It supports that  
14 MUARC report 307 correctly determines enforcement cameras have virtually no effect on road  
15 trauma even though studies show average speeds are reduced at camera sites. And it reviews  
16 Allsop's 2013 report which claims speed cameras reduced KSI crashes, shows no correlation  
17 between the change in average speeds and the change in crash rates at camera sites.

18 It reviews research on crash rates by road type and speed limits, and finds no correlation between  
19 crash rates and average speeds.

20 This paper shows that it cannot be asserted that crash rates increase with average speed. This has  
21 serious implications for the reports that show speed limit enforcement reduces speeds and then use  
22 Nilsson, TRL, Kloeden or other results to claim there would be a reduction in casualty crashes.

## 23 **Introduction – safe driving and the role of speed and speed limits**

24 Safe driving/ riding requires:

an alert driver/ rider, not impaired by alcohol, illicit drugs, prescribed drugs, a medical  
condition or fatigue,

the use of occupant protection equipment, and

choice of an appropriate speed and appropriate clearance distance to allow them to stop or  
swerve in time to avoid a collision.


25 Speed has been recognised as a factor in crashes from before the “Speed kills” campaigns in the  
26 1970s. And speed limits and speed limit tolerances have in some jurisdictions been increasingly  
27 used to control vehicle speeds. Since the early 1970’s there has been a progressive increase in speed  
28 detection/speed enforcement equipment. And in evaluating the effectiveness of these technologies it  
29 has been a fairly common practice to measure the effect of the devices on average speeds and then  
30 use relationships between average speeds and crash rates to predict changes in crashes.

## 31 **Speed and crashes – a conceptual model**

32 For a particular vehicle, driver and situation the chance of a crash is asymptotic. Take two vehicles,  
33 travelling at 90 km/h, with maximum deceleration rates of 8.5 m/s<sup>2</sup>, and driver reaction times of  
34 1.25 seconds, with the front vehicle suddenly braking. The impact speed vs separation distance can  
35 be modelled.

36

**Figure 1. Impact speed versus initial separation distance**




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38 The results are shown in Figure 1. At separation distances greater than 32 m there will be no crash.  
39 And below 32 m the crash outcomes will escalate with decreasing separation distance from minor  
40 damage to serious damage, injury and possible death as impact speeds increase.

41 For a particular on road situation the overall crash risk factor will depend on the crash risk factors  
42 for the range of vehicles and conditions that occur at that location. For example consider a 275  
43 meter curve with 4.5% superelevation. This curve would be likely to have a 70 km/h advisory speed  
44 limit.

45

**Figure 2. Likely distribution of crash risk on a 275 m curve**



46

47 In icy conditions vehicles would slide and crash off the road or into each other at around 60 km/h. A  
48 semitrailer with a high heavy load would rollover at around 90 km/h and so on. The crash risk for  
49 the population of vehicles over a range of weather situations approximates an S-curve. And in a  
50 100/110 km/h speed zone the relevant crash risk curve would be the section from 0 to ~120 km/h.  
51 To this crash risk would need to be added risks associated with distracted, impaired or fatigued  
52 drivers crashing off the curve at any speed.

53 Provided the drivers of the various vehicle types adjust their driving to the conditions, crash rates  
54 will be very low at speeds up to around 120 km/h. Then they will begin to increase dramatically.

55 **Driver populations and crash rates**

56 Based on all the data I have seen over my 50 years of involvement in road safety and using  
57 Australian data I have been able to determine the following approximate crash causation rates.

58 **Table 2: Crash causation rates per years of driving – Australian data**


| Crash type   | Most responsible 30% | Next 50%   | Less responsible 12% | Irresponsible 8% |
|--------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Fatal        | 140,000 yrs          | 42,000 yrs | 10,500 yrs           | 1800 yrs         |
| Serious      | 8,700 yrs            | 2,500 yrs  | 950 yrs              | 155 yrs          |
| Other injury | 500 yrs              | 150 yrs    | 90 yrs               | 15 yrs           |

59 As shown the responsible 80% of drivers have very low crash rates. The chance of them causing a  
60 crash where someone is injured is around once in 2 to 3 driving lifetimes. And necessarily these  
61 drivers must be skilled at choosing appropriate speeds and clearance distances to avoid crashes,  
62 must not drive when they are unimpaired, and must use occupant protection devices.

63 And being the majority of drivers they have a huge impact in controlling driving behaviour on  
64 roads. Except where traffic is light this group basically controls vehicle speeds.

### 65 **Driver behaviour – speed versus speed limits**

66 **Figure 3. Average speeds versus speed limits on a length of UK B class road**




67  
68 The Figure 3 is from UK DfT Traffic Advisory Leaflet 2/06. These average speeds are basically  
69 controlled by the 80% of responsible drivers. It is interesting to note the degree to which these  
70 drivers follow the actual speed limits. In the initial 40 mph zone the drivers chose generally to travel  
71 above the speed limit; in the following 50 and 40 mph zones the drivers chose to follow the speed  
72 limits with one significant variation; and in the 60 mph zone the drivers chose to travel below the  
73 speed limit. Note that the enforcement tolerance in the UK is 10% of the speed limit +2 mph so that  
74 except in the initial 40 mph zone the average driver would not be at risk of being infringed.

75 **Average speeds reflect driver's responses to perceived varying levels of risk. And in the 60**  
76 **mph zone, average speeds along this 7 km length varied from 40 mph to 60 mph. In a study of**  
77 **average speed versus crashes average speed measurements could be highly variable.**

78

79 **Figure 4. Average speeds versus traffic flow on a section of the Monash Freeway in Victoria**  
 80 **Australia (speed limit 100 kph)**



82 Figure 4 is from the VicRoads Managed Freeways Handbook (2013) Figure 24

83 In Australia drivers drive on the left side of the road, so the left lane is the slowest lane and the right  
 84 lane is the fastest lane in a three lane freeway situation. In the uncongested situation speeds in left-  
 85 hand lane average 90-95 km/h; 95-100 km/h in the middle lane; and 100-105 km/h in the right lane.  
 86 Once a lane reaches saturation the speeds rapidly drop. And lower speeds equal lower capacity.


87 As shown in this figure at 400 vehicles per hour in the uncongested situation vehicles are travelling  
 88 at about 100 km/h, or 100,000 metres/h. Assuming the average vehicle length was about 4.5 m then  
 89 the 400 vehicles would occupy 1800 m of the 100,000 m. Hence the average distance between them  
 90 equals  $(100,000 - 1,800) / 400$  or of the order of 250 m. And at 800 vehicles per hour in the  
 91 uncongested situation vehicles are travelling at around 96 km/h, or 96,000 m/h. The same  
 92 calculation gives a separation distance of the order of 120 m. It would therefore be expected that  
 93 crashes would be rare in a mid block situation. However low traffic flow would allow less  
 94 responsible drivers to travel faster than the general traffic stream, and create a risk of serious  
 95 crashes. In comparison in the saturation zone and congested zone, the average separation distances  
 96 will be 25 metres to 55 m (1.2 to 2.5 seconds) with significant risk of nose to tail crashes especially  
 97 at intersections. However because vehicle travel speeds before braking will be similar and lower,  
 98 crash severity is likely to be low.

99 **In summary figure 4 reflects a large range of speeds and clearance distances and varying**  
 100 **crash type risks. For the purpose of average speeds and crash rates, a single value for average**  
 101 **speed for this segment of road, or any other road that is subject too serious levels of**  
 102 **congestion during peak hours is a nonsense.**

### 103 **Crash rates versus speed limits by road class**

104 If crash rates increased with average speed in an absolute sense, it would be expected that the road  
 105 classes with the highest average speed would have the highest crash rates.

106

**Figure 5. Trauma rates versus road category USA & UK**

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108 As shown in the diagrams above (USDOT(2003) Figure 4 & Bayliss (2009) Figure 6) to a large  
 109 extent the reverse is true – the roads with the highest speeds – the motorways and freeways – have  
 110 the lowest crash rates. And the roads with the lower speeds have the highest crash rates.

111 And this supports that the role of speed is not as determinative as some road safety practitioners  
 112 would like the public to believe.


### 113 **Research by Nilsson (2004)**

114 Nilsson's research used Swedish National Road Administration 1997 mean speed data for two lane  
 115 roads with a road width of 13 m - 43 road sections had a speed limit of 90 km/h and 62 Road  
 116 sections had a speed limit of 110 km/h. Crash data was for the period 1991 to 1997.

117 The data was grouped by average speed to give reasonable number of crashes per group. In the 90  
 118 km/h zones the groupings were 87-91 km/h (94 crashes), 92 km/h (154), 93-94 (200), 95-96 (144),  
 119 97 (190), 98 (190), 99 (116) and 100-112 (165). In 110 km/h zones the groupings were 97-100  
 120 km/h (53), 101-102 km/h (63), 103 (163), 104 (136), 105 (104), 106-108 (118), 109 (94) and 110-  
 121 112 (96).

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**Figure 6. Nilsson (2004) Figure 28**




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124 Figure 6 above shows the 16 fatal accident rates together with Nilsson’s power model curve in pink,  
 125 plus a linear model and a power model from be accident rate data. What is not highlighted is the  
 126 fact that these data points relate to road sections with different speed limits. And the fact that the  
 127 road managers had specified different speed limits is prima facie evidence that they perceived the  
 128 risks with the two road types to be significantly different.

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*Figure 7. Based on Nilsson (2004) Figure 28*




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131 Figure 57 shows the two groups of data highlighted separately, plus one outlier value circled in red.  
 132 Once again on Nilsson’s power model curve is shown in pink.

133

*Figure 8. Trend lines based on Nilsson (2004) Figure 28*



134

135 Three linear trendlines have been added in figure 8 above - for the 90 km/h data; for the 110 km/h  
 136 data; and for the 110 km/h data less the one outlying value. Note that the linear trendlines are  
 137 significantly different in slope to the Nilsson third power model except for the adjusted trend for the  
 138 110 km/h data. Similar results are found for other crash types. This brings into question the validity  
 139 of Nilsson's power model given that the trendlines are different for the different road types.


#### 140 **Research by Allsop (2013)**

141 In Appendix 4 - Joint Analysis of Collision and Speed data, data was examined for eight UK Speed  
 142 Camera Partnership (Partnership) areas. Where it was clear that one or more observations were  
 143 made before establishment of a camera and one or more afterwards, the observations of mean speed  
 144 before and after establishment were each averaged, and the difference between the two averages  
 145 was taken as an estimate of the change in mean speed in the vicinity of the camera following its  
 146 establishment.

147 Changes in mean speed were estimated in this way for 132 cameras in these eight Partnerships, and  
 148 ranged from a reduction of 13.7 miles/h to an increase of 1.7 miles/h. All but three were reductions.

149 The change in collision occurrence at the camera concerned was measured by number of personal  
 150 injury crashes (PIC) per year in the vicinity of the camera in years throughout which the camera  
 151 may have been in operation.

152 **Figure 9. Change in PIC crashes versus change in average speed – 132 UK speed camera sites**



153

154 Allsop's data is shown above with the trend line shown in green. Note he found a slight increase in  
 155 PIC crash crashes with reductions in average speed. I have compared Allsop's data and trend with  
 156 the predicted trends by TRL and Nilsson based around the average of all Allsop's data. As shown  
 157 Allsop's data does not support the TRL or Nilsson trendlines at all. And importantly it does not  
 158 support that reducing average speeds necessarily reduces crashes.

#### 159 **Research by Kloeden and McLean (1997) – Urban roads**

160 This study was a case/ control study

#### 161 **Case vehicles**

162 The following criteria were used for the selection of case vehicles: Crash was in the Adelaide  
 163 metropolitan area, with a 60 km/h speed limit, not on a section of road with an advisory speed sign  
 164 of less than 60 km/h, case vehicle was a car or car derivative, at least one person was transported  
 165 from the crash scene by ambulance, case vehicle had a free travelling speed prior to the crash, was  
 166 not executing an illegal manoeuvre prior to the start of the crash sequence, the case vehicle driver  
 167 did not suffer from a medical condition that caused the crash, and had a zero blood alcohol  
 168 concentration (BAC), there was sufficient information was available to carry out a computer-aided  
 169 crash reconstruction, the case vehicle did not roll over, and crash did not occur while it was raining.

170 Cases were restricted in the interest of uniformity. Higher speed zones would have had  
 171 fundamentally different speed distributions which would have made the case-control analysis more  
 172 complicated to perform and the results harder to interpret.


173 The end result was that only 28% of the notified crashes were selected for analysis. Those crashes  
 174 were disproportionally intersection crashes between cross traffic or turning traffic (60% of cases  
 175 versus expected frequency of around 17%-20%).

#### 176 **Control vehicles**

177 The selection of 4 control vehicles were based on same location, weather conditions, day of week,  
 178 and time of day as the crash; same direction of travel as the case vehicle; car or car derivative, free  
 179 travelling speed, and most were checked for zero BAC.

180 **Figure 10. Distribution of average speeds of groups of control vehicles**






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182 As shown average speeds of the control vehicles varied dramatically from 43 km/h up to 74 km/h.  
 183 As these average speeds are the result of decisions made the 80% of responsible drivers to vary  
 184 their speed and clearance distances to suit to condition, it must be the case that the risks vary  
 185 dramatically between sites. Reference to the actual Kloeden and Mclean data and drawings shows  
 186 that the high speeds were recorded on roads where the pavement width in one direction was 12 m  
 187 wide or more, whilst in the low speed situation the pavement width had been restricted to 6 ½ m  
 188 wide in one direction using traffic calming methods.

189 Kloeden and McLean professionally used available information to determine the speed of the case  
 190 vehicles prior to the crash. However inexplicably when they analysed the data to determine a crash  
 191 risk, they used 60 km/h as the reference speed instead of the average speed of the control vehicles  
 192 (as would be required the approach taken was to use the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile free speed for vehicles  
 193 travelling on a particular length of road.

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*Figure 11. Crash risk versus speed differential*

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And in figure 11 above the dashed line shows the results of their analysis. Note that there is hardly any increase in crash risk for vehicles travelling much slower than 60 km/h. This is in conflict with the general experience in road safety that shows that vehicles travelling much slower than the traffic stream represent a significant crash risk – hence all the warning signs and lights required with slow moving vehicles.

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In my paper Lambert (2000) I reanalysed the data using the control vehicle average speeds as the reference speed. The results of my analysis are shown in figure 11 in the full black line (I have overlaid the Kloeden and McLean graph placing the zero value at the 60 km/h value of the original graph).

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The implications of my analysis is that it's not the average speed differential from 60 km/h that controls crash risk, it is the variation from the average speed that the 80% of responsible drivers choose that is the critical factor. And note that as expected vehicles travelling much slower than the average travel speed also generate a significant increase in crash risk. My graph shows that the increase in crash risk is around eight times at a speed 20 km/h slower than the average traffic speed, and about eight times at a speed that is around 20 km/h faster than the average traffic speed.

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213

In summary the crash rate does NOT double for every 5 km above 60 kph - in fact 60 km/h has no relevance in this matter at all.

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#### **Research by Kloeden and McLean (2001) Rural roads**

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
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218

This research project was of a similar design to the previous research project but for rural roads. The differences were that rather than limiting cases to a single speed limit zone, it covered 80 kmh, 100 km/h and 110 km/h speed zones. In addition the analysis followed the approach in Lambert (2000).

219

220

**Figure 12. Control vehicle average speeds versus speed limit or advisory speed**

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222 As is shown above at most sites the average speed for control vehicles are significantly less than the  
 223 speed limit or advisory speed. In only 14 (8.4%) of the 167 cases is the average control group speed  
 224 at or above the speed limit or within 5 km/h of the speed limit. Prima facie this reflects that  
 225 responsible drivers perceive the sections of road where the crashes occurred as being of higher risk,  
 226 and as a result reduce their speed to control that risk. And the implications of this are that the data in  
 227 this research project is only appropriate in relation to speed limits at problem locations in the rural  
 228 road network.

229 The results showed that the crash risk increases significantly where vehicles travel faster than the  
 230 speed responsible drivers would choose for the particular location and environment. And as alluded  
 231 to in the previous paragraph it gives no guidance as to how speed impacts on crashes in low risk  
 232 section of the rule network – that is relatively straight sections of road good sight distances. And the  
 233 research definitely does not show that crash risk in rural areas varies with average speed.

### 234 **Research by Taylor et al (2002) TRL Report TRL511**

235 This Research Report aimed at determining the relationship between speed and crash rate on UK  
 236 Rural roads with 60 mph speed limits.

237 Four Groups of roads were identified that can be broadly described as follows:

238 *Group 1: Roads which are very hilly, with a high bend density and low traffic speed - low quality*  
 239 *roads.*

240 *Group 2: Roads with a high access density (lots of side roads and driveways), above average bend*  
 241 *density and below average traffic speed - lower than average quality roads.*

242 *Group 3: Roads with a high junction density, but below average bend density and hilliness, and*  
 243 *above average traffic speed - higher than average quality roads.*

244 *Group 4: Roads with a low density of bends, junctions and accesses and a high traffic speed - high*  
 245 *quality roads.*

246 Unfortunately nowhere in the paper is the base data displayed so that readers are faced with a black  
 247 box analysis. Two model structures were developed – Level 1 which was of the structure where  
 248 accident count = Function(years of accident data; AADT flow; link length; mean speed); and Level  
 249 2 which was of the structure where accident count = Function(years of accident data; AADT flow;  
 250 link length; mean speed; road geometry). Model results were presented in Figure 3 of the report.


251 The Report is puzzling to the writer for a number of reasons. Firstly it contains none of the base  
 252 data. This is a critical deficiency in that a reader has no opportunity to review the base data or the

253 analysis. And I am aware that others have tried to get this base data to review this paper and no one  
 254 has been successful. And the current advice is that the data is no longer available! One is left to  
 255 wonder why this paper is given so much credibility, other than the fact it supports the group  
 256 thinking about speed and crashes.


257 Figure 2 represents the model for a very specific situation, and figures is A1 and A2 are a  
 258 synthesised construction to demonstrate a masking situation.

259 Further the trends shown in Figure 3 of the report did not make sense to the writer in relation to any  
 260 hypothesis as to what factors would drive reductions in crash frequency or KSI crash frequencies  
 261 versus mean travel speeds. This is especially so given that responsible drivers are very good at  
 262 adjusting speeds and mean speeds to maintain a high level of safety. I decided to analyse the trend  
 263 lines in Figure 3 of the report. That analysis showed the crash frequency trend line  $\approx 2.405 \times (1/V)$ ;  
 264 and the KSI crash frequency trend line  $\approx 2.765 \times (1/V)$ . The correlation between the TRL511 report  
 265 data and my model is shown in figure 13 below.

266 **Figure 13. Comparison between TRL511 trend lines and my model**



267  
 268 And the authors of TRL 511 offer no hypothesis as to why % reductions are proportional to the  
 269 inverse of the mean speed on rural single carriageway roads.



271 As shown in the segment of Figure 1 of the TRL report, low quality group 1 roads are associated  
272 with low mean speeds and high crash rates, whilst high-quality group 4 roads are associated with  
273 high speeds and low crash rates. Hence a reasonable hypothesis is that the relationship shown in  
274 figure 13 is the result of the influence of road standard. That is, on the high standard Road risks are  
275 low and so crash rates are low – and because of the lower risk responsible drivers choose to travel at  
276 higher mean speeds. And on the low standard roads the risks of crashes are much higher, and so the  
277 crash rate is significantly higher. And responsible drivers perceiving the increase in risk slow their  
278 speed in response to that increase in risk.

## 279 **Conclusion**

280 Almost universally studies into mean speeds versus crashes have failed to recognize that a) speed  
281 alone never defines safe driving – it is speed and clearance distance that underlies safe driving; b)  
282 that on heavily trafficked roads traffic flow has a complex and dramatic impact on speed and on  
283 types of crashes; c) that on lightly trafficked rural roads crashes are mostly concentrated at “black  
284 spots” connected by safe sections of roads– yet the safe sections are where speeds are checked; and  
285 d) that responsible drivers continually adjust speeds even within a speed zone so that any mean  
286 speed reading is highly likely to not represent the mean over all parts of any segment of section.

287 There is little consistency in the various models. The slope of the Allsop trend line is opposite to the  
288 slopes of other models, and the Kloeden serious crash trend is very different to the other trends.

289 In summary based on my analysis of the reports above, and the concerns stated, there is no robust  
290 model that can be used to predict reductions in crash frequency with reductions in mean speed.  
291 Further data from various jurisdictions show that the highest speed roads have the lowest  
292 fatality/crash rates per 100 million km, so there is no underlying relationship between speed and  
293 crashes that would indicate a reduction in crashes with a reduction in mean speed. And finally given  
294 that speed alone never describes safe driving, it is not unexpected that any research aimed at  
295 relating speed alone to crashes is likely to be inconclusive.

296 And as a result, when researchers find a reduction in speed, for whatever reason, there is no way for  
297 them to assert how that would translate into lower crash rates or reductions in trauma. To state the  
298 obvious if drivers are travelling at a safe speed for the conditions, forcing them to travel at a lower  
299 speed by applying an unrealistically low speed limit cannot achieve any significant gain in reduced  
300 crash rates. All it does is increased travel time and the cost of travel to society.

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